Review of Robert C. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State by Levinson-Waldman, Rachel
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 2 
Winter 2012 
Review of Robert C. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic 
Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State 
Rachel Levinson-Waldman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Review of Robert C. Post, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A 
First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 245 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol48/iss2/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
FOR THE MODERN STATE
Rachel Levinson-Waldman*
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). Pp. 177.
Hardcover $30.00.
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") published
what is considered to be the definitive professional statement on academic freedom.1 The
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure declares that academic free-
dom entitles college and university teachers to "full freedom in research and in the publi-
cation of the results," a privilege that is in furtherance of "the common good." 2 In the last
century, moreover, AAUP has built a multilayered "common law" of academic freedom
developed through the accretion of AAUP statements and the reports and decisions of its
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which is considered by many academ-
ics to be the ultimate arbiter on the matter.3
The judicial attitude towards academic freedom, by contrast, has generally been a
series of gut feelings in search of a coherent philosophy.4 While the seminal AAUP
statements date from 1915 and 1940, the Supreme Court's first recognition of academic
freedom did not come until the McCarthy era, when state loyalty oaths and inquiries into
professors' ideological leanings loomed as existential threats to the academy. 5 In 1957,
the Court rather vaguely pronounced "academic freedom and political expression" as
* Counsel, Liberty and National Security Program, Brennan Center for Justice; former Senior Counsel to
the American Association of University Professors. All views expressed are the author's own.
1. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3-11 (10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter 1940 Statement];
see also 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, in AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 291-301 (10th ed. 2006) [here-
inafter 1915 Declaration].
2. 1940 Statement, supra note 1, at 3.
3. See, e.g., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Resources on Academic Freedom, AAUP,
http://www.aaup.org/issues/academic-freedom/academic-freedom-and-freedom-information-requests-
2011/resources-academic (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
4. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality
opinion).
5. Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234.
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"areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread" - an inspiring but
not particularly concrete exhortation that would characterize much of the Court's juris-
prudence on academic freedom. 6
In that case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Attorney General of New Hampshire
- under pressure from the state legislature - interrogated a guest lecturer at the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire in an attempt to discern whether he was a Communist sympa-
thizer.7 After the lecturer, Paul Sweezy, refused to answer, he was thrown in jail for con-
tempt of court.8 Reversing the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision affirming the
contempt charge (the state supreme court believed there was a constitutional "right to
lecture," but also believed the state had a compelling interest in rooting out com-
munism9 ), a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that the "essentiality of free-
dom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident." 10 The Court ex-
tolled Sweezy's individual rights to "academic freedom and political expression," the
importance of those rights to "the future of our Nation," and the risk that without them,
civilization itself might "stagnate and die." 1
A decade later, overturning a state loyalty oath it had upheld as constitutional some
fifteen years earlier, a majority of the Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents explicitly
situated academic freedom within the Constitution, calling it "a special concern of the
First Amendment."l2 Noting that academic freedom "is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned," the Court continued: "[t]he classroom is pe-
culiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection."' 1 3
In dismissing the notion of an "authoritative selection" of ideas, the Court was pre-
sumably referring to the government's selection of ideas by means of a loyalty oath.
What the Court overlooked, however, was that "authoritative selection" is precisely how
scholarship operates and how excellence is determined in academia: through the selec-
tion by one's peers of the "correct," or best reasoned, views. While the classroom may at
times be a marketplace of ideas, the classroom, the laboratory, and the university are in
fact places where there are often "right" and "wrong" ideas, or at least "right" and
"wrong" theories. This makes the classic understanding of the First Amendment - that
it protects, in essence, my right to say anything I want - a surprisingly poor fit for aca-
demia.
This tension between the public view of the First Amendment and academic free-
dom, which remained under the surface in the major public employee speech cases of the
intervening decades, came to a head in the Supreme Court's 2006 case, Garcetti v. Ce-
6. Id. at 250.
7. Id. at 236-38.
8. Id. at 244-45.
9. Id. at 249.
10. Id. at 250.
11. Id.
12. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
13. Id. (citations omitted).
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ballos.14 In Garcetti, which involved a retaliation claim by an assistant district attorney
in California, the Supreme Court held that when a public employee speaks "pursuant to
[his] official duties," that speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, 15 even when it
is - in the words of the Supreme Court's earlier seminal cases of Pickering v. Board of
Educationl6 and Connick v. Myersl7 - on "matters of public concern."I1 As the Garcet-
ti majority ruled, "[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's pro-
fessional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed
as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the em-
ployer itself has commissioned or created."l 9
The majority recognized that "additional constitutional interests" might be at stake
when it comes to "expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction,"
and therefore declined to decide whether its "official duties" analysis would apply in
those cases.20 Nevertheless, Justice Souter noted acidly in dissent that he hoped the ma-
jority did not "mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in pub-
lic colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to ...
official duties."' 2 1
In the six years since Garcetti, Justice Souter's fears have largely been realized and
the majority's caution largely ignored. Although the Supreme Court has not returned to
the question of First Amendment protection for academic freedom, the lower courts have
largely failed to see any constitutional sunlight between public employees in general and
their academic brethren. One of the many consequences of the increasing restrictiveness
of the Supreme Court's public employee speech jurisprudence has therefore been the
constriction of the First Amendment rights of public sector faculty members as well.
Robert Post, the dean of the Yale Law School and an expert on both the First
Amendment and academic freedom, offers a radical and powerful answer to this dilem-
ma in his slim new volume, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First
Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State.22 He proposes that the constitutional
foundations for academic freedom have been misconstrued over the past half-century and
offers a ground-breaking solution that would align it with a First Amendment doctrine
that has not met the same dispiriting fate as the public employee speech canon: the com-
mercial speech doctrine.2 3
Post starts with what seems to be something of a tautology, but becomes a more
convincing method of disentangling First Amendment doctrine as the book unfolds. He
posits that "[t]he actual contours of First Amendment doctrine cannot be explained mere-
14. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
15. Id. at 421.
16. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
17. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
18. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420.
19. Id. at 421-22.
20. Id. at 425.
21. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
22. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012).
23. Id. at 38-39.
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ly by facts in the world .... [W]e can learn the purposes we have constructed First
Amendment doctrine to achieve by tracing the contours of actual First Amendment cov-
erage."24 In other words, the only way to learn about First Amendment doctrine is to
study First Amendment doctrine. 25
Post describes three major rationales for First Amendment protection: (1) cogni-
tive, by which the purpose of First Amendment is to "advanc[e] knowledge and discov-
er[] truth" (that is, the classic "marketplace of ideas"); (2) ethical, by which the purpose
is to "assur[e] individual self-fulfillment" so that people can realize their "character and
potentialities as a human being;" and (3) political, by which the purpose is to "facilitat[e]
the communicative processes necessary for successful democratic self-governance." 26
He concludes that the third, which he calls "democratic legitimation," most fully ac-
counts for First Amendment doctrine within public discourse - though he goes on to
demonstrate that outside the realm of public discourse, where academic freedom in fact
resides, there is an entirely different mechanism at work.28
With respect to the marketplace of ideas, Post concedes that it "captures something
essential to the growth of knowledge."29 As he explains, however, it is incapable of de-
veloping expert knowledge, which is the result not simply of aggregation of information
but of "intervening in the world through research, theory, and experiment."30 The pro-
duction of expert knowledge relies upon peer judgment and the ability to declare an idea
false, an exercise that is rightfully anathema to the egalitarian values of the marketplace
of ideas. 3 1
Post disposes of the ethical purpose similarly quickly. As he observes, Americans
are committed to the equality of persons, and "[tlhe primary ethical value that has been
ascribed to the First Amendment is that of autonomy or individual self-fulfillment" -
that is, "all persons ought to be accorded the equal dignity to fulfill their unique individ-
ual potential."32 He explains, however, that there are many ways to express one's auton-
omy, and they are certainly not all protected under First Amendment jurisprudence. 33
Defamation law, for instance, imposes some limits on speech. 34 Moreover, constitutional
protection for government employees' speech has little to do with the speaker's autono-
my and is predicated instead on whether the expression is on a matter of public concern
(assuming it is also not "pursuant to official duties"). 35 And he notes that for profession-
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. Id. at 1. Notably, Post also distinguishes between First Amendment coverage - that is, what govern-
ment action implicates the First Amendment - and First Amendment protection, or how courts will treat that
government action in the context of the First Amendment. Id.
26. Id. at 6 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
27. Id. at 17-18.
28. Id. at 34-35 (espousing the idea of "democratic competence," which "refers to the cognitive empower-
ment of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary knowledge").
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id.
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als like doctors, their speech is constitutionally protected at some times, as when speak-
ing to the public, but not when speaking to their own patients, at which point they are
bound by professional malpractice rules. 36
Post's argument feels slightly underdeveloped here. He does not explore, for in-
stance, whether defamation could represent a conflict, rather than an absence, of auton-
omy: a contest between the speaker's autonomy to express her (arguably factually false)
feelings and the subject's autonomy to maintain her reputation without having to refute
the speaker's lies. In this framing, because the value of making false statements is fairly
low and the autonomy value of preserving one's dignity is fairly high, the target's auton-
omy interest wins - but not because it is the only autonomy at stake. Similarly, with re-
spect to protection of government employee speech, one could charitably interpret the
Court's emphasis on the employee's status as citizen to reflect the importance of auton-
omy: when the employee is speaking as a citizen, his autonomy interest is at a peak, and
to penalize the employee even when he speaks as a citizen would be to symbolically in-
fringe the autonomy of all citizens. 37
The real purpose of these explorations, however, is to demonstrate that existing
First Amendment protection for public discourse is consistent with a political, not ethical
or even cognitive, purpose of the First Amendment - and here Post shines. 38 Pointing
out that First Amendment attention is paid to public officials, public figures, and matters
of public concern, Post concludes that the real purpose of the First Amendment "is to
protect the free formation of public opinion that is the sine qua non of democracy." 39
Given this, First Amendment coverage must extend to all communications that form pub-
lic opinion so that "those who are subject to law should also experience themselves as
the authors of the law" and thus realize democratic legitimation. 4 0
Post has the crucial insight, however, that this take-all-comers approach exists only
within the realm of public discourse. 4 1 Outside of public discourse the government often
both compels and regulates speech - requiring the labeling of dangerous products or the
disclosure of communicable diseases, for instance, and regulating professional advice-
giving or securities trading.42 As Post explains, while all people contributing to the dem-
ocratic process are viewed as having equal autonomy, outside the realm of public dis-
course "the law commonly regards persons as dependent, vulnerable, and hence une-
qual," and thus intercedes to ensure basic access to accurate information. 4 3
Post attributes both values - autonomy protection on the one hand, and dignity
protection on the other - to a democratic interpretation of the First Amendment, by
which a "political domain of public opinion creation" is distinguished from the "non-
political domains of civil society."44 This democratic interpretation, however, which re-
36. Id. at 44-45.
37. See id. at 13.
38. Id. at 15-16.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 17.
41. See id. at 21.
42. Id. at 22-23.
43. Id at 23 (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 24.
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jects a purely autonomy-focused interpretation of the First Amendment, also sets in relief
the central paradox tackled here: democratic engagement requires expert knowledge, but
the central value of the First Amendment, the safeguarding of public opinion creation, is
incompatible with the rigorous disciplinary conventions that enable the formation of that
knowledge.45
Post proposes to reconcile the two by positing a separate purpose of the First
Amendment that is safeguarded by the development of disciplinary competence and ex-
pertise.46 He calls that purpose "democratic competence," and one of the groundbreaking
insights of his book is that that value is already reflected in a zone of First Amendment
jurisprudence that resides outside the sphere of public discourse, and that might suggest
an analogous constitutional home for academic freedom as well: the commercial speech
doctrine. 47
The Supreme Court has held that commercial advertising is "covered by the First
Amendment because it is relevant to 'public decision-making in a democracy."'48 This,
says Post, confirms that "speech can be protected because it serves the value of demo-
cratic competence." 49 Moreover, because advertising is valuable by virtue of the infor-
mation it conveys, the state has a corresponding right to regulate advertising to ensure
that inaccurate or misleading information is not circulated, and even to ensure that vital
information is disclosed - quite different from the state's role when it comes to public
expression. 50
If commercial information bolsters democratic competence, Post reasons, so too
does expert knowledge.5 1 The trick, then, is to find analogous constitutional protections
for the two categories.52 As he acknowledges, however, there are significant differences
between the two categories of speech. As an initial matter, commercial speech has an
entire branch of First Amendment law devoted it; expert knowledge does not. 54 In addi-
tion, the speech of experts is governed by malpractice law, which does not offer the First
Amendment as a defense; commercial speakers, by contrast, may invoke the First
Amendment as a defense. 55
Post concludes that the primary rationale for the different treatment of expert
speech and commercial speech rests upon the dissimilar relationships between the speak-
ers and their audience: the commercial speech doctrine presupposes an equality between
the advertiser and audience, where the audience is "mature" and "independent," while a
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Id. at 33-35.
48. Id at 40.
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id. at 41-42.
51. Id. at 43.
52. Post's exercise is increasingly vital beyond the academic realm. In the past four years, the executive
branch has waged an unprecedented war on government whistleblowers, a group of people who almost by defi-
nition have a particular area of unique expertise and incur great personal risk to educate the public. The devel-
opment of a doctrine that clearly protects expert knowledge is all the more critical against this backdrop.
53. POST, supra note 22, at 43-45.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id. at 45-46.
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person seeking professional advice is presumed to be dependent upon the expert's judg-
ment.56 As Post neatly puts it, the lack of a First Amendment defense to a malpractice
claim in fact "emphasizes the significance which law attributes to the circulation of accu-
rate expert knowledge." 57 Moreover, where state laws - abortion statutes, for instance
- have compelled experts to give inaccurate information or withhold truthful infor-
mation, the courts have generally accorded the experts First Amendment coverage.58
Unfortunately, one of Post's examples undermines his premise. He cites to a Ne-
braska statute forcing doctors "to give untruthful, misleading, and irrelevant information
to patients." 59 The statute was "held to implicate the 'First Amendment rights of medical
providers' and was accordingly enjoined."60 Given Post's powerful defense of expert
knowledge as the foundation for the public 's democratic competence, his situating of ex-
pert knowledge outside the realm of traditional public discourse, and his emphasis on the
vulnerability of those relying on expert judgment, it is startling to see him give pride of
place to a decision that privileges the First Amendment rights of the doctor, and not her
patients.
He also highlights a statute that carries his point more effectively, however. The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA") pro-
hibited "debt relief agencies" from advising someone contemplating filing bankruptcy to
incur more debt, which is a perfectly legal move in most situations.61 The statute was
challenged on the grounds that it kept attorneys from conveying accurate, lawful infor-
mation to their clients.62 Every lower court that interpreted the statute as limiting attor-
ney speech found that it violated the First Amendment; when the matter finally reached
the Supreme Court, the Court construed the statute narrowly to avoid the main constitu-
tional question, ensuring that attorneys would still be able to provide their clients with
accurate legal information in nearly every circumstance.63 Post concludes that the First
Amendment protection for this attorney speech, as well as the regulation of attorney ex-
pression via malpractice law, reveal "the constitutional value attributed to the circulation
of expert knowledge." 64
56. Id. at 46-47.
57. Id. at 47.
58. Id. at 47-48.
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (D. Neb. 2010) (emphasis
added)).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2012); POST, supra note 22, at 48-49.
62. POST, supra note 22, at 49.
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id. A case decided after Post's book was published can be read to further support his point, though it
superficially constrains the government from regulating commercial expression. In August 2012, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the Food and Drug Administration had acted unconsti-
tutionally in requiring cigarette manufacturers to print graphic warning labels on packages of cigarettes. The
appeals court distinguished between, on the one hand, the government's ensuring that consumers receive accu-
rate information so they are not deceived, and, on the other, using commercial speakers to deliver its "point of
view on how people should live their lives." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). In not so many words, the court held that the government can compel expression when it wants to
ensure a baseline of democratic competence, but cannot intrude into the public discussion. See id. at 1221-22.
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Post misses an opportunity here to make a helpful though somewhat dispiriting
point. He is building up to a constitutional jurisprudence that protects disciplinary
knowledge and academic freedom - the type of knowledge and expertise produced by
public sector faculty members, who are otherwise at the mercy of their state employers.
As he aptly observes at the beginning, public employee speech is generally under threat,
which makes it particularly critical to articulate a distinction between the general run of
public employees and those engaged in developing expert knowledge.65 What he does
not note, however, is that even public employees who are not academic experts - scien-
tists at the National Institutes of Health, for instance - may also be uniquely knowl-
edgeable as a result of their public service. If their comments about their areas of exper-
tise are construed to be "pursuant to their public duties" and thus unprotected, public
decision-making as a whole will be increasingly impoverished.
In staking out the boundaries of constitutional protection for expert knowledge as
revealed through the lens of commercial speech, Post reasons that the "scope of First
Amendment coverage" - the categories of expert knowledge that do or do not implicate
the First Amendment, as a separate matter from which categories are actually protected
by the First Amendment - must "depend upon judicial assessment of the relevant state
of expert knowledge." 66 That is, courts themselves must use the "disciplinary methods
by which expert knowledge is defined," and thereby "attribute constitutional status to the
disciplinary practices by which expert knowledge is itself created."67 And this inevitably
means that courts will immerse themselves in the granular questions of disciplinary truth
to an extent that initially seems beyond the scope of appropriate judicial involvement.
Post provides a neat example of this dynamic. He hypothesizes a state law prohib-
iting payment for astrological advice.68 A First Amendment challenge to the statute
would rise or fall on a court's determination of the "truth" of astrological advice, which a
court might feel empowered to decide without expert input.69 In the case of something
more difficult, however, such as whether the recommendation of a particular homeo-
pathic remedy can be regulated, the court will have to make a two-step determination.70
If the court already believes that homeopathic medicine produces valuable knowledge, it
will survey experts in homeopathy about the particular treatment in question. 7 1 If the
court has doubts about homeopathy overall, however, it will ask experts in a separate es-
tablished scientific discipline about homeopathic practice.72 If it concludes that homeo-
pathic knowledge has value, it will then rely upon experts in that area to resolve the spe-
cific question. 73 As Post explains, "[w]hatever discipline a court applies will acquire
constitutional status." 74 And this process creates a "constitutional sociology of
65. See POST, supra note 22, at I1-12.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id. at 54-55.
68. Id at 55.
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 56-57.
71. Id. at 57.
72. Id.
73. Id
74. Id at 58.
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knowledge," by which certain disciplines become the measure by which courts deter-
mine whether regulations interfere with First Amendment rights. 75
Post reasons that if certain disciplines receive constitutional recognition, so too
must the "disciplinary practices and methods that create such knowledge," as well as the
institutions that nurture them, all of which must be "immunized" from political manipu-
lation.76 This doctrinal structure, he concludes, preserves both public discourse and
democratic competence by effectively separating the "sphere of knowledge" and the
"sphere of power."7 7
Post has ably set up his final and perhaps most provocative question: whether con-
stitutional doctrine, in addition to ensuring the flow of expert knowledge to the public,
also extends First Amendment coverage to "state actions that inhibit the creation of ex-
pert knowledge."7 8 Post perceptively notes that the initial judicial articulations of aca-
demic freedom pointed to something we can now identify as the value of democratic
competence. 79 In Sweezy, for instance, the Justices were most offended by the Attorney
General's interrogations about Professor Sweezy's classroom lectures. 80 Those lectures
were not part of public discourse and thus did not implicate democratic legitimation; in-
stead, Sweezy's relationship to his students (even as a visiting professor) was like the
relationship between a lawyer and his clients - that is, he owed them a duty of compe-
tence.8 1 Indeed, Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion and Justice Frankfurter's con-
currence, taken together, invoke the importance of "intellectual leaders"82 who may "ex-
amine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs" in the "pursuit of
understanding." 83
Post also highlights two critical differences between academic freedom and profes-
sional speech and the different implications that democratic competence has for the
two.84 First, professionals are required to transmit existing expert knowledge to their cli-
ents, whereas academic freedom allows room for experimentation and challenge of exist-
ing beliefs; that is, scholars are expected to create new knowledge.85 This expectation
results in an unresolvable tension "between, on the one hand, expanding the frontiers of
existing knowledge, and, on the other hand, competently exemplifying existing discipli-
nary standards." 86 This tension plays out in the distinction between non-tenured faculty,
who must constantly prove competence within the confines of existing knowledge, and
75. Id.
76. Id. at 59.
77. Id
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id. at 62.
80. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957) (plurality opinion).
81. See id. at 247-49.
82. Id. at 250.
83. Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
84. POsT, supra note 22, at 67-68.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id. at 73.
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tenured faculty, who are given much more flexibility to "facilitate the academic freedom
necessary for creating new knowledge." 87
Post is right to call this particular tension "persistent and without resolution."88
One of the sharpest challenges to the system of tenure is that it can ossify disciplines in
the ontology of established faculty, while younger faculty - particularly women in tra-
ditionally male disciplines or faculty of color in traditionally white disciplines - some-
times struggle in a system where their elders determine the acceptable parameters of dis-
ciplinary belief. Tenure-track faculty must often be just creative enough to demonstrate
that their work offers something new to the field, but familiar and non-threatening
enough to elicit an offer of lifetime employment from their future colleagues.
The second difference that Post identifies is that academic freedom refers both to
the faculty and to certain actions of the university, whereas other professions have no in-
stitutional analogue.89 Indeed, as Post notes, the university has historically played a vital
and unique role in nurturing and producing disciplinary knowledge; Paul Sweezy's
speech, for instance, was protected even as a guest lecturer because he was "participating
in the disciplinary training appropriate to a university setting." 9 0
This tension between institutional and individual academic freedom has at times
been the source of both academic inquiry and judicial opinions, some perceptive and so-
phisticated and some simply misbegotten. Post makes relatively short work of this ten-
sion, however, reasoning that individual and institutional academic freedoms are recon-
cilable:
[I]f we appreciate that the function of First Amendment doctrine is to protect First
Amendment values, and . .. the First Amendment value at stake in academic free-
dom of research and publication is democratic competence. This value encom-
passes both the ongoing health of universities as institutions that promote the
growth of disciplinary knowledge and the capacity of individual scholars to pro-
mote and disseminate the results of disciplinary inquiry. 9 1
Thus, he says, the appropriate deference is to "the professional scholarly standards
through which knowledge is created." 92
This inquiry is fine as far as it goes (and we should be so lucky for courts to see
this as clearly as Post does), but Post then overreaches a bit. In support of the suggestion
that judicial and state regulation of professional advice is generally acceptable but that
the state and courts should tread lightly in the realm of academic expertise, he asserts
that "[t]he distinction between competent and incompetent economics scholarship is a
great deal more murky than the distinction between competent and incompetent medicine
or legal advice." 93 This is far from obvious. When "Obamacare" was passed, legal schol-
ars who warned that it was open to serious constitutional challenge were practically
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 74.
90. Id. at 76.
91. Id. at 77.
92. Id. at 78.
93. Id. at 79.
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laughed out of the academy. By the eve of the Supreme Court's decision, however, the
betting markets were firmly predicting (wrongly, as it turned out) that the statute would
be struck down on constitutional grounds.94 Similarly, as an astute district court judge
observed in a post-Garcetti academic freedom case, established medical opinion held for
nearly two centuries that leeches were a barbaric relic of an earlier era; they are now
commonly used to hasten healing after certain surgical procedures.95 Indeed, much like
tenured professors, the best lawyers and doctors may be those who are creative, stub-
born, and unwilling to be bound by dogma.
Post's final point here is well-put notwithstanding these contradictions. Regardless
of whether medicine and the law are murky at times, it is certainly appropriate for courts
to craft a First Amendment doctrine that safeguards, in the words of the AAUP's 1915
Declaration, the "freedom of thought, of inquiry ... of the academic profession."96
"That freedom," says Post, "is necessary both to the effective functioning of state univer-
sities and to the realization of the constitutional value of democratic competence."9 7
Post closes by warning of the inevitable consequences if the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Garcetti extends to faculty: the "entrench[ment of] a constitutional vision of
universities that disciple rather than discipline,"98 a vision severely at odds with the his-
torical development and public purpose of the university. Post neatly summarizes the
tension between the majority's core holding in Garcetti and the AAUP's 1915 Declara-
tion ofPrinciples on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, the precursor to the 1940
Statement and one of the foundational statements of academic freedom:
[T]he argument of the Declaration is that faculty serve the "public" insofar as
they serve the public function of identifying and discovering knowledge. It is this
function that triggers the constitutional value of democratic competence. Were
faculty to be merely employees of a university, as Garcetti conceptualizes em-
ployees, their job would be to transmit the views of university administrators.
Faculty would then no longer expand knowledge, because they would no longer
be responsible for applying independent professional, disciplinary standards. In
such circumstances, universities would no longer advance the value of democratic
competence.
[This result would] strip this nation of an invaluable resource, one that has pro-
pelled us to the forefront of the world stage. In today's information age, intellec-
tual stagnation implies economic and military failure. Much depends, therefore,
on the extent to which the Court appreciates the full weight that rides on the casu-
al reservation that it advanced in Garcetti.99
94. Benjamin Hart, Obama Health Care Law Predictions: A Roundup, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2012,
6:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/obamacare-predictions-supreme-court-n_16321 10.html
(identifying several scholars who predicted the Court would hold the law unconstitutional).
95. Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 844 n.11 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
96. POST, supra note 22, at 80 (quoting 1915 Declaration, supra note 1, at 300).
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id. at 90.
99. Id. at 92-93.
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As Post has just proved, the "full weight" riding on the Court's "reservation" in
Garcetti is the understanding that scholarly inquiry and expression and the development
of scholarly expertise carries the weight of democracy on its back. That inquiry and ex-
pertise must therefore be protected not only for its own sake, as is an individual's speech,
but for the sake of us all.
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